## Tuition DA

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#### Student protests bloat administrative costs, which drives tuition up

Kelly 15 [Andrew Kelly (resident scholar and founding director of the Center on Higher Education Reform at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC), "The Real Winners In Campus Protests? College Administrators," Forbes, 11/24/2015] AZ

The consequences for civil society are important. But the aftermath has implications for college costs and postsecondary opportunity, as well. College execs typically respond in the way they know best: by promising to layer new deans, services, and centers onto an already enormous administrative apparatus. Ironically, protests against the administration will almost certainly grow the ranks, power, and budget of administrators, and somebody will have to pay for the additional overhead. More often than not, students will be stuck with the bill; higher tuition prices, in turn, may further depress access for needy students. To be clear, student activism isn’t what’s causing administrative bloat. Colleges need little excuse beyond the changing of the fiscal year to hire more non-teaching staff. Data from the Delta Cost Project show that the number of non-teaching professionals at public research universities rose from 53 per 1,000 students in 1990 to 73 in 2010. The ranks of full-time faculty barely budged, moving from 62 per 1,000 to 64. At private universities, the average number of professionals went from 72 per 1,000 students to 102 over that same period. After evaluating spending patterns at four-year colleges between 1987 and 2008, economist Robert Martin concluded that growth in administrative spending and staffing (as opposed to teaching faculty) was a major driver of increasing college costs. But crises—bad press, student protests, competition from rival schools—provide a more immediate reason for colleges to gin up additional administrative positions. Whether an additional dean and some support staff will “solve” the problems on campus (they almost certainly will not), hiring them signals to campus activists and the media that leaders are doing something. (To be fair, protesters’ demands call for some of this growth; at Mizzou, students have called for more “funding, resources, and personnel” for “social justice centers” on campus.) Hence, Yale’s response to protests includes doubling funding for cultural centers and the creation of a new multicultural center (in addition to an existing $50 million campaign to increase the diversity of the faculty). Brown has promised a $100 million diversity initiative. Claremont McKenna will create “new leadership positions on diversity and inclusion” in the offices of academic and student affairs. At Ithaca College, site of more November protests, leaders announced the creation of a “Chief Diversity Officer.” Such positions are not rare in higher education. As the Manhattan Institute’s Heather MacDonald has shown, the set of administrative jobs dedicated to diversity in the University of California system actually grew in recent years despite a steep decline in state appropriations (and equally steep increase in tuition). And additional executives often bring sizable staffs with them; Berkeley’s vice chancellor for equity and inclusion has seventeen staff members listed in the “immediate office.” Now, activists will argue that not all of the new money will fund administrative positions, and that additional non-academic staff will help improve the rate at which minority and low-income students succeed. That may be true if spending goes toward productive ends like augmented student services. But it’s hard to see how simply adding a new administrative office will change longstanding incentives that lead colleges to exclude many qualified students in the first place. It will, however, certainly introduce new fixed costs to a university’s balance sheet, increasing long-term spending. For a school like Yale, with a big endowment, the additional administrative expense may not affect tuition and financial aid much. But at institutions where resources are scarcer, additional administrative spending will likely be financed on the backs of students. Incoming students who manage to get in and pay the bill may find a more welcoming environment (though that’s far from certain), but others may find that there’s less financial aid money around to help them pay.

#### At public colleges specifically, increasing tuition kills enrollment rates

Hemelt & Marcotte 8 [Steven W. Hemelt (Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Policy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Dave E. Marcotte, "Rising Tuition and Enrollment in Public Higher Education," Institute for the Study of Labor, November 2008] AZ

We do, however, find substantial differences in enrollment responses at different types of colleges and universities. We find larger effects of tuition increases on enrollment at Research I and “top 120” public universities than we do at comprehensive universities and public liberal arts colleges. Moreover, enrollment is less sensitive to aid at Research I universities, and those in the “top 120” of the U.S. News and World Report rankings. At public colleges and universities of this type, it appears that the near-term consequence of increased tuition is a decline in enrollment. On the other hand, at comprehensive universities it appears that tuition increases don’t necessarily mean lower enrollment, rather they mean more reliance on aid for the students who do enroll.

#### College graduation rates are key to US innovation and global competitiveness

**Elzey 10** [(Karen, Vice President of the Institute for a Competitive Workforce) “Education: The Key to Global Competitiveness”, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation’s Center for Education and Workforce, 5/17/2010] DD

As of January 2010, the United States’ jobless rate stood at 9.7 percent. Yet for individuals with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the rate was substantially less — 4.9 percent. Conversely, for people who lack a high school diploma, the rate was noticeably higher — 15.2 percent. Clearly, education matters. And it matters not just for the job seeker. America’s future in the global marketplace is at stake, too. The United States faces challenges on myriad education fronts. High school graduation rates are depressingly low, college remediation rates are rising, adult literacy levels are too low, and the numbers of Americans earning advanced degrees in science and engineering are lower than they have been in years. High school dropout rates in the United States are at or near 30 percent. For African American and Hispanic students, the rate is even higher — a staggering 50 percent. Even for those who do graduate from high school and make their way to college, many require some kind of remedial instruction. America’s leaders are beginning to gauge the seriousness of the issue. In his 2009 address to a joint session of Congress, President< Obama pledged that “by 2020, America will once again have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world.” This will be a significant challenge. Of the nation’s 307 million people, 93 million adults do not possess the necessary literacy levels to enter either postsecondary education or job-training programs, according to the 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy. DEMANDING JOBS Making matters even more challenging, the educational attainment level required for jobs continues to rise. Anthony Carnevale, Director of the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, estimates that by 2018, nearly two-thirds of all jobs in the United States will require some form of postsecondary education or training. In 1973, just 28 percent of jobs, or less than one-third, required such instruction. The demand for workers to obtain meaningful credentials has never been more important. America’s education system is critical in this effort. The United States has long prided itself on its leadership in innovation. Much of this innovation has come from expertise in science and engineering. America’s lengthy run atop the innovation scoreboard, some suggest, might be near the end. They point to the fact that the nation’s science and engineering workforce is aging. A serious skills shortage in these fields could be imminent if not enough graduates are produced to replace retiring scientists and engineers.

**US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises**

**Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13** (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of **deep engagement** is that it **prevents** the **emergence** of a far more **dangerous** globalsecurity **environment**. For one thing, as noted above, the **U**nited **S**tates’ overseas **presence gives** it the **leverage to restrain partners from** taking **provocative action**. Perhaps more important, its core **alliance commitments** also **deter states** with aspirations to regional hegemony **from** contemplating **expansion** and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged **U.S. power dampens the** baleful **effects of anarchy** is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John **Mearsheimer**, who **forecasts** dangerous **multipolar regions replete with** security **competition, arms races,** nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, **and** even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale **great power war.** 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a **Europe** that **is incapable of securing itself from** various **threats that could be destabilizing** within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably **Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia**—might **take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas**. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, **which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China**. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s **optimism about what would happen if the U**nited **S**tates **retrenched is** very much **dependent on its** particular—and highly **restrictive—assumption about state preferences;** once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. **Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences**, however, undermines that core assumption**: states have preferences** not only for security but also **for** prestige**, status, and other aims**, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that **even states that are relatively secure may** nevertheless **engage in** highly **competitive behavior**. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the **withdrawal of** the **America**n pacifier **will yield either a competitive** regional **multipolarity complete with** associated insecurity, arms racing, **crisis instability,** nuclear proliferation**, and** the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional **great power war**). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, **one would see** overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional **proxy wars and** arming of **client states**—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, **the debate over the stability of prolif**eration**changes as the numbers go up**. Proliferation **optimism rests on assumptions of rationality** and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, **such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic**. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. **Confidence** in such probabilistic assumptions **declines if the world were to move from nine to** twenty, thirty, or **forty nuclear states**. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclearproliferation—including **the risk of accidents and the prospects that** some new nuclear **powers will not** **have** truly **survivable forces**—seem prone to **go up** as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen **crisis dynamics**” that **could spin out of control** is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “**The U**nited **S**tates **will** have to **play a key role in countering China**, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, **the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship**, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which **the case for retrenchment misses the** underlying **logic of** the **deep engagement** strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### Low Tuition K2 Enrollment

### A2 Tuition High Now

#### There isn't a particular threshold we cross in which tuition is too high – treat the disad not as a yes/no question, but a sliding scale of manageable risk – a drastic spike in tuition due to protests increases the risk of enrollment dropping beyond the necessary threshold for US innovation

#### Tuition decreasing now

UPI 13 [United Press International, "To draw students, colleges slicing tuition, cutting financial aid," 10/11/2013] AZ

Faced with scaring off potential students with the high cost of education, some U.S. colleges say they are lowering tuition while decreasing discounts. School administrators contend that by dropping the cost of tuition they can attract more students and raise more revenue, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday. Few students actually pay the full published tuition costs, says the National Association of College and University Business Officers. With grants and scholarships, the real cost to students is about half of what the recruitment brochure states. Such tuition schemes are a threat to small private colleges, who say they can't continue to make such deals. Several schools such as Converse College in Spartanburg, N.C., and Ave Maria University in Ave Maria, Fla., plan to cut tuition by more than 20 percent in the fall of 2014. At the same time, the schools provide fewer aid packages. Converse said it will cut tuition rates by 43 percent, dropping its published $29,000 tuition to $16,500. It also will offer less merit aid. Administrators say they expect to attract enough new students that revenue from undergraduate tuition will jump 11.6 percent. Concordia University in St. Paul , Minn,, dropped its tuition 10 percent, expecting to draw 24 more students. Some 100 more enrolled.